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Introduction
The general consensus seems that the gov-
ernment of Colombia is well on its way toward
achieving the long-sought goal of effective
and comprehensive governance of its terri-
tory. Two strong presidential administrations
have worked vigorously to mute the violence
that once screamed throughout Colombia’s
countryside while simultaneously pushing for
constitutional reforms aimed at fair reparations
to the victims of violence and justice to the per-
petrators (Alcantar, p. 2).
The optimistic turn in Colombia’s fortune
in the twenty-first century provides an oppor-
tunity to hold the country to a higher standard.
As President Santos engages in peace talks with
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-
bia (FARC), Colombia’s primary paramilitary
organization, the prospect of peace in the coun-
try—once a tantalizing improbability—is now
perched brightly on the horizon. And as a new
era of peace dawns on the country, the gov-
ernment’s newly acquired legitimacy illumi-
nates other severe problems once shadowed
by the looming threat of civil unrest. These
problems stem not primarily from paramili-
tary organizations, drug traffickers, or narco-
terrorists but from the country’s legal system,
which struggles to administer justice, pro-
mote a feeling of safety and well-being among
Colombians, and function as the moral back-
bone of a modern democracy.
This article provides an analysis of the cur-
rent state of Colombia’s legal system. It begins
with some historical context, aimed at tracing
the evolution of Colombia’s legal system from
an inquisitorial system to an accusatory one.
Once this context is established I outline the
most pressing problems facing Colombia’s legal
system—from a grotesquely high rate of
impunity to the challenges imposed by consti-
tutional mandates requiring reparations to 
victims of violence and light sentences for con-
fessed war criminals. Next, I explain how struc-
tural failings and philosophical inconsistencies
81
IMPUNITY IN THE WAKE 
OF CONFLICT
Aidan Fennelly
within the legal system make addressing these
problems particularly difficult. Finally, I con-
clude with an analysis of how Colombia is 
currently working to correct the problems 
with its legal system and how, despite the
problems of the recent past, it remains a coun-
try worthy of a positive outlook on its legal
future.
This article is based on the philosophy that
a functioning judicial system is essential to
establishing a legitimate, fair, and effective
national government. While the minimal qual-
ification for “government” is any authoritative
body with a monopoly of force, such a stan-
dard implies too soft a definition of force and
ignores the importance of law and order.
Although Colombia has made tremendous
progress toward establishing a legitimate mod-
ern democracy, forces of internal violence in the
form of unprosecuted criminal behavior
threaten to undermine the country’s promising
growth into a fully functional democratic state.
Colombia’s Legal History
Colombia has undergone two major
reforms in the structure and philosophy of its
criminal justice system, both of them attempts
to rectify high levels of impunity,1 corruption,
and inefficiency. Although both of these reforms
were the product of well-intentioned, reasoned,
and intelligent policy discussion, they nonethe-
less left the country with a legal system plagued
by the same dangerous cocktail of problems2
(Alcantar, p. 1). 
Historically, there are two different legal
traditions and their accompanying systems of
implementation prevalent in Western jurispru-
dence. A civil law system, which originated in
ancient Rome, codifies law into a set of writ-
ten rules that citizens are expected to follow.
The role of judges in this system is to act
inquisitorially, that is, they are responsible for
investigating if a law has been broken and for
determining if an accused individual is guilty of
violating said law. Civil law takes codified or
written law as its fundamental operating prin-
ciple. As such, precedent is often ignored, and
juries are rarely used because expert judges
are considered the most qualified to deter-
mine if a law has been broken. Legal systems
that rely heavily on the principles of civil law are
often called “inquisitorial” because they place
judges and magistrates in the position of mak-
ing inquiries into whether or not a law has been
broken and if the accused party is guilty.
Common law systems usually have some
form of written law as well, but they operate
under a different legal philosophy than their
civil law counterparts. Common law, which
originated in England, uses court decisions to
establish a body of precedent that serves as
the guideline for how judges should rule in
given circumstances. In cases for which there is
no precedent, common law allows for judges
to essentially create law by establishing a new
precedent. The rationale for a common law sys-
tem is that every crime is a product of individ-
ual circumstances and that a civil law–like set
of codified principles fails to take into account
differences of circumstance that differentiate
one crime from another. Common law usually
makes use of an adversarial legal system, in
which two parties argue their case against an
impartial judge or jury of their peers who then
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Although most Western countries use
some combination of a civil/common law sys-
tem, prior to the constitutional reform of 1991,
Colombia operated under an almost entirely
inquisitorial/civil law legal system, inherited
from Spanish colonizers. Essentially, this sys-
tem empowered judges to act as detectives, pros-
ecutors, and defense attorneys in criminal cases.
A typical criminal proceeding evolved as such:
the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad
(DAS) (Colombian equivalent of the U.S. Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation) would initiate
investigation of a crime and gather initial evi-
dence before passing the case on to an investi-
gatory judge, who then took control of the case,
monitored the investigation, and determined
whether or not it was suitable for trial. If a
case went to trial, the evidence gathered by
the DAS and investigatory judge was passed
on to a trial judge, who weighed the evidence of
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1Impunity means exemption from punishment for an
action. In the legal sense this refers to crimes that were com-
mitted and reported but remain unsolved or unpunished.
2The biggest problems afflicting the system are
high levels of impunity, an inefficient bureaucratic struc-
ture that suffers from hierarchical ambiguity, and asymme-
try, corruption, and tensions between the executive and leg-
islative branches of government.
both parties and made a judgment on the out-
come of the trial (Pahl, p. 615).
This system placed an enormous amount
of power and autonomy in the hands of the
judges, who were required to fill numerous (and
often contradictory) roles in judicial proceed-
ings. For example, the inquisitorial judge,
responsible for overseeing the pretrial phase
of the case, was required to play both sides of
the fence when it came to criminal investiga-
tions. The system required these judges to over-
see the investigation of the accused in order
to protect the defendant from illegal evidence
gathering, but it also charged them with direct-
ing the very investigation that they were sup-
posed to be refereeing. It does not take a great
deal of imagination to envision how impartial-
ity could quickly disappear when one individual
is charged with both organizing an investiga-
tion and reporting any ethical or legal breaches
within it. Oversight becomes a misnomer when
it is completely internalized (Torres, p. 3).
The clear conflict of interest that the
inquisitorial system produced translated 
into poor judicial oversight and left the sys-
tem highly vulnerable to external influences.
Because power was concentrated so heavily in
the hands of the judges, they were highly sus-
ceptible to bribes, intimidation, and other forms
of extortion. Inquisitorial judges had the power
to accuse individuals of crimes, dismiss key
pieces of evidence, stall the prosecution, and
deem a case unfit for trial, while their trial-judge
counterparts played prosecutor, defendant,
and jury in the second phase of judicial proceed-
ings. It would only take one well-timed bribe or
scare tactic to convince a judge to sabotage a
case entirely, no questions asked. Evidence sug-
gests that this happened routinely, because
the price for not doing so was incredibly high.
Between 1979 and 1991, 550 Colombian judges
were assassinated, most likely for not succumb-
ing to coercion (Torres, p. 4).
Another problem with the inquisitorial
system that left it susceptible to corruption was
that it worked in secrecy. The findings of inves-
tigations, accounts of witnesses, testimony of
the accused, and legal reasoning of both sides
of the case were often presented to judges in
written form to insure impartiality, but this also
reduced transparency and shielded extortion
from the public eye (Torres, p. 6). As the Colom-
bian lawyer Andres Torres notes, “The ‘behind
closed doors’ approach to the inquisitorial
model lent itself particularly [to bribery and
extortion]” (Torres, p. 6).
These issues, which could perhaps be
explained as byproducts of an outdated legal sys-
tem, were made worse by a government that
routinely neglected, mismanaged, and under-
funded its legal system. Judges and lawyers alike
were often undertrained, underpaid, and highly
susceptible to bribery and extortion (Heyden, 
p. 1). Funds allocated to the judiciary were often
misappropriated, embezzled, or used to fund
unnecessary projects, like the $7.2 million judi-
cial palace in Manizales (Peters, p. 1). Thus, a
system that by design found itself vulnerable
to corrupting influences did not get much
help from its internal structure.
Although some scholars suggest that the
inquisitorial system grants government broad
authority over criminal prosecution, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the inquisitorial
system effectively maintained law and order in
Colombia prior to 1991 or that it operated
with much efficiency (Pahl, p. 611). Studies sug-
gest that in the 30 years before the 1991 consti-
tutional reform, the impunity rate was an alarm-
ing 98.8 percent, meaning that only 1.2 percent
of reported crimes resulted in a conviction
(Pahl, p. 609). Furthermore, far from making
the judicial process more efficient, the inquisi-
torial system’s extensive investigation process
and focus on written testimony resulted in a
tremendous backlog of cases—some 1.3 mil-
lion—and the average criminal proceeding
could drag on for two years (Torres, p. 4).
Individual rights were also jeopardized.
Colombians accused of a crime were often
detained during the investigation period; by
some estimates, 60 percent of Colombian’s
prison population consisted of individuals await-
ing trial (Torres, p. 5). Furthermore, access to
legal representation was extremely hard to come
by, particularly for those unable to afford an
attorney. Torres notes that poorer Colombians
“would be fortunate to receive legal assistance
from an unpaid law student volunteering his or
her time” (Torres, p. 5).
External problems, like corruption, extor-
tion, and an abrasive lack of concern for indi-
vidual rights, were not the only ones plaguing
the system. The power granted to judges was
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widely viewed as too broad, by both the other
arms of Colombian government and by the
judges themselves. As alluded to previously, a
tremendous backlog of cases paralyzed the judi-
cial system, as individual judges struggled to
juggle the responsibilities of jury, attorney,
and investigator. However, tensions were also
high between the national police and the judges,
mostly because the former resented the lat-
ter’s sweeping authority. As a result, many cases
reported to police officers never found their way
to a judge’s chambers (Pahl, p. 618). An inter-
nal disregard for the integrity of the system
mired it further in dysfunction.
Sweeping Change
Thankfully, change came in the form of a
drastic overhaul. In 1991, the Colombian gov-
ernment addressed the pressing need for judi-
cial reform by dropping the inquisitorial/civil
law system and moving closer to something
resembling the U.S. model of accusatorial
legal proceedings. The 1991 constitutional
reform stripped judges of their investigative
power; it provided for the creation of an inde-
pendent attorney general’s office, or Fiscalía,
whose job it is to gather evidence and prosecute
crimes on behalf of the state. It clearly delin-
eated the roles of judges, prosecutors, investi-
gators, and defendants and allowed for these var-
ious branches of the legal system to debate
and interact in public and transparent trials
mediated by impartial judges (Torres, p. 6).
Furthermore, these changes to the consti-
tution allowed for individual citizens to petition
the court for immediate action in cases when
constitutional rights have been violated—a
process known as tutela (JURIST . . .). It also
promised the right to legal representation,
and allowed for other forms of dispute resolu-
tion—like plea bargains—that were denied 
to individuals under the old system (Torres, 
p. 8).
These reforms seemed to address all the
major problems that plagued the Colombian
inquisitorial system. They provided citizens with
the authority to challenge the excessive use of
government power; they created an independ-
ent prosecutorial system, which allowed judges
to act as referees and not as lords of the judi-
cial arena; and they diffused power through-
out a multifaceted system, which made the
prospect of bribery and intimidation more 
difficult.
Unfortunately, what looks good on paper
does not always make for good governance.
Although these reforms did address major struc-
tural concerns within the legal system, some
scholars worry that they did little to stem the
other issues—such as corruption, bribery,
shoddy police work, and a general lack of infra-
structure—that dogged the old system (Erazo,
p. 2). Furthermore, while the 1991 reform
stripped judges of their excessive power, it did
not effectively curb abuses of legal authority.
According to Pahl, “From the Anglo-American
perspective, the [1991] Colombian system rep-
resents less a Lockean system of minimal gov-
ernment respecting the rights of citizens, and
more a Hobbesian Leviathan capable of probing
into the most intimate and private areas of a per-
son’s life, all in the name of law and order and
investigative efficiency” (Pahl, p. 631). Indeed,
the 1991 legal system provided little protec-
tion to citizens from abuses of what we consider
civil rights. More importantly, even in cases of
severe malpractice, the tutela proved ineffective
thanks to severe backlogs within the legal sys-
tem (JURIST . . .). Thus, the drop in impunity
legislators and scholars predicted in light of the
1991 reforms never came and instead prompted
another set of reforms ten years later.
These reforms came under the Uribe
administration in conjunction with the United
States under the Plan Colombia and sought to
provide the country with a fresh approach to law
and order. Essentially, Colombia abandoned the
vestiges of the inquisitorial system that
remained after the 1991 reform and moved to
aggressively prosecute a wide range of smaller
crimes with the hope of lowering the coun-
try’s dismal impunity rate (Erazo, p. 5). To facil-
itate this, Colombia enacted Law 906, which
abandoned the slow and inefficient tradition
of trying cases as written arguments in favor
of a purely oral system of litigation, like the one
used in the United States. Law 906 also guaran-
teed the right to an attorney and allowed for out-
of-court settlements like plea bargains as an
alternative to trial (Torres, p. 8). The Uribe
administration did this while simultaneously
passing constitutional mandates requiring repa-
rations to victims of violence and allowing
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reduced sentences for war criminals who con-
fess to their crimes. Unfortunately, these well-
intentioned reforms have done little but exac-
erbate the problems latent within Colombia’s
criminal justice system.
The system, as imagined under Uribe and
Plan Colombia, failed to effectively address the
major problem plaguing it: severe judicial back-
log. The reason is that the judicial system is
comprised of three distinct and competing judi-
cial organizations: a network of private courts
headed by the Supreme Court that handles
private civil and criminal cases; another court
that handles “public” or administrative law; and
a third Constitutional Court, Consejo Nacional
de la Judicatura, which is responsible for pro-
tecting constitutional rights. It is to this last
court that individuals may appeal via tutela.
Unfortunately, these appeals often result in deci-
sions by the Constitutional Court that dis-
agree or undermine the rulings of the Supreme
Court. In short, the different heads of Colom-
bia’s legal system often struggle to find consen-
sus (Silva Cano). The results (discussed later)
are crippling inefficiency and alarming levels of
impunity.
What is more, the attempts made by Uribe
under Plan Colombia to expedite the resolu-
tion of pending cases and reduce backlog
resulted in the Justice and Peace Law, which
allowed for former paramilitaries and guerillas
to come forward and confess their crimes in
return for lighter punishment (a maximum
eight-year prison sentence). This law was pre-
sented as a means of moving beyond Colombia’s
violent past—but it has come under criticism
from human rights groups, including the UN,
who worry that it aids impunity and seeks to
sweep human rights violations under the rug
(Human Rights Watch, p. 1). Thus, Colombia
is still struggling to overcome the vast array of
problems that, despite numerous attempts at
reform, continue to plague the criminal justice
system.
Justice Denied: The Problems Facing
the System Today
It is not surprising that in Colombia—a
state whose democracy is in its infancy—strug-
gles to administer justice effectively within its
borders. What is surprising, however, is the
severity of Colombia’s judicial ineffectiveness.
According to the World Bank, Colombia
ranks 178th of 183 countries in terms of judi-
cial efficiency (Erazo, p. 4). This means that jus-
tice is, for all intents and purposes, denied to the
average Colombian citizen. According to the
U.S. Office on Colombia, it takes an average of
1,346 days for a filed complaint to reach a
decision (Erazo, p. 4). In 2008, the system faced
a ten-year backlog of cases—meaning that a
major judicial proceeding could take up to ten
years to be resolved, not including appeal. The
impunity rate still stands at 80 percent overall
and is even higher for severe crimes, such as
rape, murder, and kidnapping (Erazo, p. 4). The
U.S. State Department estimates that, as of
2008, the impunity rate for murder (5 percent
of crime in Colombia) is nearly 100 percent. The
impunity rate for violence against women stands
at 98 percent and for human rights violations at
90 percent (Erazo, p. 15).
These statistics are shocking, but numbers
fail to truly represent the grave effects impunity
can have on victims of violence and their fam-
ilies. In May 2012, a 40-year-old woman was
walking home after tending to her livestock
when an army commander dragged her into a
bush and brutally raped her. She reported the
rape to his superior, but the charge was dis-
missed; subsequent inquiries into her case have
failed to produce a suspect. In an even more hor-
rific case of impunity, Irina del Carmen Villero
Díaz’s rape and murder at the hands of a para-
military in 2001 remains unsolved. Paramili-
taries have threatened Irina’s mother, Blanca
Nubia Díaz, and her lawyer as they petition
the government to investigate the case more
aggressively, yet neither woman has received
any sort of police protection, and the investi-
gation continues to progress at a snail’s pace
(“Colombia: Hidden from Justice . . . ,” p. 18 ).
Why is it that, despite extensive judicial
reform, impunity is such a problem? In short,
the current system struggles to deal with the
enormous backlog of residual cases from
Colombia’s dubious and ineffective history of
jurisprudence. In light of this, Colombia’s
legal system continues to underinvest in its judi-
ciary. Approximately 1.3 percent of the Colom-
bian budget is allocated toward the judicial 
system (Silva Cano). This is so despite that,
according to a report by Lawyers without 
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Borders Canada and the Colombia Caravana 
UK Lawyers Group, Colombian prosecutors
remained swamped with an overwhelming
amount of work (Colombian Caravana . . . , 
p. 22). In certain regions of the country, pros-
ecutors are tasked with handling, on average,
over 700 cases (Heyden, p. 1). Frustration over
a lack of resources has persuaded some judges
to embezzle funds for their pensions—and in
December 2012 precipitated a strike that froze
90 percent of Colombia’s judicial proceedings
(Trent, p. 1). 
However, Colombia and its legal system
would struggle even if impunity were not the
norm and if crime were prosecuted efficiently
and effectively. This is the case because Colom-
bia’s prison system is undersized and unequipped
to handle an influx in its inmate population. It
is estimated that Colombia’s prison system is
overcrowded by at least 38 percent3 (“Prison
Overcrowding . . .”). If Colombia’s 80 percent
impunity rate were to drop by 10 percent, its
prison system would be physically unable to
handle the influx of inmates (Erazo, p. 4). This
does not even begin to touch on the condi-
tions of the prisons themselves. The Alliance for
Global Justice reports that inmates at La Tra-
macúa prison are given access to running water
for an average of ten minutes a day, often eat
food contaminated with fecal matter and bacte-
ria, and are regularly beaten and tortured by
guards (Jordan).
There seems an obvious question: how can
Colombia have a very high impunity rate and
a prison system that operates at 40 percent
above capacity? The answer to this question is
complicated, mired in politics, and indicative of
deeper discord between the country’s various
branches of government.
Colombia has long struggled with a high
impunity rate. This is a problem for apparent
reasons, but it also has grave effects on the
country’s image internationally; after all, respect
in the international community (already noto-
riously hard to come by) is difficult to garner
when statistics indicate that a country cannot
exert the rule of law within its own borders.
Thus, when President Uribe came to office in
2002 with the goal of modernizing Colombia’s
democracy with the help of the U.S.-led Plan
Colombia, the impunity rate was high on his
agenda. In an effort to lower the rate, the
Colombian government implemented Law 906,
which essentially borrowed characteristics of the
U.S. penal model, including aggressive prosecu-
tion of minor crimes. Rivera and Barreto sug-
gest that this measure was effective in lowering
the impunity rate—but only for what we would
consider misdemeanor crimes: small time theft,
property crimes, etc. (Erazo, p. 5). However,
because these crimes are prosecuted and sen-
tenced aggressively—with prison time—Colom-
bia finds itself in a bind. Impunity rates are
lower, as more crimes are being solved, but
many of these crimes previously did not (and
should not) require jail time. As a result, Colom-
bia’s prisons are overcrowded with poor small-
time offenders while the impunity rate for severe
violent crimes hovers around 100 percent.4
The new system incorporated under Plan
Colombia tried to protect the rights of the
accused and mitigate this problem through
acción de tutela. Unfortunately, thanks to the
tremendous backlog in the system, the time it
takes to file and hear a tutela case often fur-
ther undermines the judicial process as a whole
by deadlocking an already slow system with an
additional slew of appeals (JURIST . . .). Fur-
thermore, the Consejo Nacional de la Judi-
catura, which hears tutela appeals, often rules
against decisions made by the highest crimi-
nal court. This greatly complicates and confuses
the legal process because it undermines the
criminal arm of Colombia’s judicial system
and provides for yet another avenue of appeal
and bureaucratic backlog (Silva Cano, p. 1). In
many ways, the addition of the Consejo Nacional
de la Judicatura, although intended to provide
protection and fairness to Colombians, has
instead pushed the system out of the realm of
due process and into the realm of over process
(Silva Cano, p. 1). 
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3Any prison overcrowding is detrimental to the
well-being of inmates, but 40 percent is pretty high. In
the summer of 2011, California’s prisons were overcrowded
by a similar rate, and the state’s penal system spiraled
into a crisis of sorts as small time offenders were released
to help alleviate the enormous strain placed on prison facil-
ities, employees, and the inmates themselves. 
4The U.S. Office on Colombia estimates that the
impunity rate for extrajudicial executions is approxi-
mately 98.5%.
Access to fair legal redress is made even
more difficult by practical and bureaucratic inef-
ficiencies within the judicial system. Accord-
ing to the U.S. State Department, 350 Colom-
bian municipalities do not have a regional
attorney general’s office (Erazo, p. 9). This
means that 31 percent of Colombia’s regions do
not have access to a judicial office where people
can file complaints, report crimes, or contest
charges filed against them (Erazo, p. 9). This
problem is especially grave in rural areas, where
infrastructure and access to transportation are
both limited. In these instances, problems of
infrastructure can be made exponentially worse
when the legal system is forced to deal with
internally displaced people,5 who may be sub-
sisting in temporary housing structures far away
from their home municipality.
Internally displaced persons pose even
larger problems for the Colombian legal system
than bureaucratic lag. Beyond the issues of
infrastructure that stall migration from rural
areas to municipal hubs where the arms of
the legal system reside, internally displaced peo-
ple affected by paramilitary violence are guar-
anteed justice under a special amendment to
Colombia’s constitution known as the Justice
and Peace Law. Although this process is great in
theory, it is a nightmare in practice. The back-
logs in the legal system that make routine
legal proceedings advance at a snail’s pace are
mired even deeper in confusion when it comes
to paying constitutionally mandated reparations
to internally displaced persons. Records of home
ownership, municipality of origin, and count-
less other relevant documents are often hard to
come by because most internally displaced
persons hail from rural areas without electronic
record keeping (Andreu-Guzmán ). Thank-
fully, the Santos administration has made
strides toward amending this problem: in 2011
it passed Law 1448 (the Law of Victims), which
greatly simplified the displacement verifica-
tion process (Rodriguez, p. 1).
Unfortunately, bureaucratic traffic jams
are among the more pedestrian problems fac-
ing the Justice and Peace Law. It has been the
opinion of many experts—including the UN
High Commission for Human Rights, the Inter-
national Center for Transitional Justice,
Amnesty International, and the Federation of
International Human Rights—that the Justice
and Peace Law seeks peace at the expense of jus-
tice and stability at the sake of fair reparations
for victims and punishments for perpetrators.
This is so because the system allows for demo-
bilized paramilitaries and their colleagues to
receive light punishment in exchange for their
confessions.6 This philosophy of forgiveness
seems like the first step toward a fresh start, but
it works better in theory than in practice.
According to the International Center for Tran-
sitional Justice, only 41 cases regarding forced
displacement have been brought to the atten-
tion of the courts, resulting in nine convictions,
one acquittal, and three absolvements (Andreu-
Guzmán).
NGOs and legal scholars are also critical of
the ways in which the Justice and Peace Law
denies justice to victims of more egregious
human rights violations. For example, in 2008
President Uribe allowed for paramilitary leader
Giraldo Serna to be extradited to the United
States to face narco-trafficking charges despite
confessing to the kidnap and murder of agricul-
tural activist Bela Henriquez (Jannish and Zill
de Grenados). This is not necessarily an isolated
incident: Amnesty International estimates
that 90 percent of demobilized paramilitaries
evaded investigation into human rights viola-
tions and that the vast majority of paramili-
tary leaders facing drug charges in the United
States refuse to cooperate in human rights cases
in Colombia. (“Impunity”).
This perhaps too cordial relationship
between paramilitaries and the Colombian gov-
ernment under the Justice and Peace Law
extends beyond the realm of unseemliness and
into the sphere of publicly recognized corrup-
tion. In 2006, the country faced a political dis-
aster known as the parapolítica (parapolitics)
scandal, when more than 30 members of Con-
gress were revealed to have been colluding with
paramilitary leaders. Among those indicted were
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5This amounts to approximately 4 million people.
Colombia has the second largest number of internally dis-
placed people, next to Sudan.
6Typically, beneficiaries of this reform receive 5–8
year sentences, unless they are guilty of a severe human
rights violation. The typical sentence for forced displace-
ment, as recognized by the Colombian government in 2000,
ranges between 10 and 20 years.
Mario Uribe, who is President Uribe’s cousin,
and Nancy Gutiérrez, who was the president
of the Colombian Senate (“Colombia’s ‘Parapol-
itics’ . . .”).
Thus, Colombia’s tense history of inef-
fective criminal justice lingers into the present.
President Santos has made judicial reform
part of his agenda, but thus far his attempts to
pass any meaningful reform through Congress
have failed. Nonetheless, I believe it is impor-
tant to look to see what Colombia can and might
do in the future to finally establish a func-
tional and effective criminal justice system.
Progress in the Face of Impunity:
Looking Forward
The focus of this article has been on the
criminal justice face of the legal coin. It has
exposed an arena of the law in which Colombia,
due to a violent history, has long struggled to
establish legitimacy. But this is not for lack of
trying. As Pahl and Alcantar suggest, despite a
rough legal history, Colombia has always been
a country dedicated to the rule of law and
order in the face of violence. Although major
reforms to the legal system in 1991, 2001, and
2005 all suggest a lack of stability, they also sug-
gest that Colombia is open to pragmatism, will-
ing to forgo legal traditions that are clearly
not working. It is this very pragmatism that has
allowed for other aspects of Colombia’s legal sys-
tem—such as business law—to prosper while
leaving the door for criminal justice reform
wedged open in spite of lingering problems from
the recent past.
While high impunity rates, corruption,
and judicial inefficiency are alarming, they must
also be contextualized. Latin America as a whole
has struggled with impunity: only five of every
hundred crimes are solved in Guatemala. Recent
violence in Mexico has left more than 100
crimes against journalists unsolved. And
Uruguay, Brazil, and Honduras all struggle with
high crime rates and low prosecution num-
bers (Baltazar and Pastrana).
In terms of corruption, Colombia is also
on par with the rest of Latin America. Trans-
parency International, an NGO that measures
corruption worldwide, ranks Colombia as 
a 3.4 on a 1–10 scale, with 1 most corrupt 
and 10 least corrupt (“Corruption Perceptions 
Index . . .”). Comparatively, Venezuela is ranked
at 1.9, Ecuador at 2.7, Peru at 3.4, Bolivia at 2.8,
and Brazil at 3.8.7 Thus, Colombia might not
have the best levels of perceived corruption
internationally but does as well if not better than
some of its neighbors.
Furthermore, although the Committee
to Protect Journalists still ranks Colombia as 
the fifth most dangerous country in the world
for journalists, the NGO concedes that this 
may have to do with some historical bias 
and notes in its most recent report that Colom-
bia has improved its impunity rate in cases
regarding violence against journalists for each
of the past four years (“Getting Away with
Murder . . .”).
Finally, although Colombia struggles with
impunity and other aspects of criminal jus-
tice, it has made enormous strides in the realm
of business law. The World Bank chose to high-
light Colombia’s progressive business law
reforms in its most recent “Doing Business”
report, noting that the country is “a regional
leader in narrowing the gap with the world’s
most efficient regulatory practice” and that,
“over time, the focus of Colombia’s reform
efforts has shifted from reducing the cost and
complexity of business regulation to strength-
ening legal institutions” as they pertain to
contract law (Saltane, p. 1).
Conclusion
This article takes a harsh tone in assessing
the state of Colombia’s criminal justice sys-
tem. As the analysis indicates, Colombia’s
impunity rates are alarmingly high. However,
impunity rates are difficult to measure. Further-
more, despite their alarming levels in Colom-
bia, they may well decrease in the future if the
Colombian Congress and Santos can agree on
judicial reforms that disentangle the jumbled
arms of various high courts and imbue the judi-
ciary with a clear sense of purpose—and the
funding necessary to carry that purpose to its
end. Additionally, although the parapolitics
scandal reflects poorly on the executive branch
of Colombia’s government, President Santos has
proved a man intent on delivering reform and
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7Comparatively, the U.S. scored a 7.1. Nordic coun-
tries rank the highest categorically, with Finland the
highest at 9.4.
deserves to be evaluated through eyes unjaded
by the misdeeds of the previous administration.
Thus, the problems in Colombia do not
exist in a hopeless vacuum. If Colombia can
work to provide the same sweeping reforms that
it instituted in the realm of business and con-
tract law to the criminal justice system, then
progress is likely. Regardless of whether or
not progress comes, if this article accomplishes
nothing else it highlights the fact that, although
Colombia has made strides in quieting inter-
nal conflict and opening up to foreign investors,
there is still work to be done. If peace talks with
the FARC usher in a new era of post-violencia
peace, then Colombia must take this opportu-
nity to turn its eyes further inward to focus on
the enemies of peace and justice that do not out-
wardly defy the government.
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